• Intelligence failure Intelligence failure President George W. Bush and the U.S. intelligence community have a lot of explaining to do in the wake of comments by chief weapons hunter that Iraq probably did not have significant stockpiles of weapons
• Intelligence failure
Intelligence failure
President George W. Bush and the U.S. intelligence community have a lot of explaining to do in the wake of comments by chief weapons hunter that Iraq probably did not have significant stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction before the war.
David Kay, who resigned last week, also said that mobile trailers found in Iraq were not biological weapons labs and that prewar intelligence on the weapons had been fundamentally wrong. Mr. Kay said he was resigning for “complex reasons,” including the reduction of his staff and a shift in focus of his weapons survey group.
True to form, even after Mr. Kay’s statements the White House asserted that the weapons of mass destruction still would be found. Vice President Dick Cheney reiterated last week the claim that the mobile trailers were biological weapons labs.
But Monday the White House seemed to be backing off its claims. Under repeated questioning, White House spokesman Scott McClellan declined to repeat assurances that the weapons would be found. Instead, he said, “We believe it’s important for the Iraq Survey Group to complete its work so we have as complete a picture as possible.” Mr. McClellan said the White House wanted to compare what the group had found with prewar intelligence.
The new White House statements seemed more in line with Secretary of State Colin Powell’s acknowledgment over the weekend that weapons of mass destruction might not be found.
Mr. Kay’s findings shouldn’t be that surprising. Hans Blix, chief of U.N. arms inspections before the war, told The Associated Press that the United States should have known its intelligence was flawed last year when leads followed up by inspectors failed to uncover weapons.
The United Nations showed before the war that documents of Iraqi uranium purchases from Niger were forgeries, that suspicious aluminum tubes were not intended for the nuclear program and that satellite photos of alleged chemical weapons plants were unconvincing.
Mr. Kay, who himself had given credence to the weapons allegations before the war, says that most of Iraq’s chemical weapons capabilities had been destroyed by President Bill Clinton’s 1998 bombing. And he says that the U.N. weapons-inspections process was successful in keeping Iraq from reconstituting its programs. Mr. Kay also suggests that Iraqi weapons scientists pulled the wool over Saddam Hussein’s eyes by promising fanciful weapons programs in order to get funding.
What is needed now is an independent review of what is shaping up as one of the most significant intelligence failures of recent decades. Such a review could be instigated either by presidential order or by congressional action. The nation needs to know why the intelligence community got it wrong and the extent to which Mr. Bush and his hawkish advisers hyped intelligence to make their case for war. Quite simply, the nation deserves to know why it went to war to eliminate weapons of mass destruction that apparently didn’t exist.
St. Louis Post-Dispatch
