After rejecting the idea in 1972, 1974, 1980, 1982, and 1984, the voters in 1988 approved changing the mayor’s term from two to four years, with a two-term limit. The change has led to unintended consequences. The two-year term, which
After rejecting the idea in 1972, 1974, 1980, 1982, and 1984, the voters in 1988 approved changing the mayor’s term from two to four years, with a two-term limit.
The change has led to unintended consequences.
The two-year term, which continues in place for Kaua‘i County Council members despite repeated attempts to change it, reflects the voters’ healthy skepticism about politicians. It functions as a built-in recall mechanism. Previously, if voters were dissatisfied with the mayor’s policies, priorities, or performance, they could choose a new mayor at the next biennial election. Now, dissatisfied voters can exercise timely recall only through a cumbersome recall petition.
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that a mayor once elected is almost guaranteed eight years in office. A taxpayer-funded, professionally produced weekly TV program adds to an incumbent’s advantage over challengers. Last fall the mayor even won reelection in the primary against four challengers.
Although the four-year term does not add statutory powers to the mayor’s office, it does allow a consolidation and extension of both official and unofficial powers, especially during the second term when normal political restraints are no longer effective in checking arbitrary mayoral decisions.
With respect to governance issues, the new arrangement tilts the balance of power in favor of the mayor both in relation to the council and, more importantly in my view, in relation to the electorate in ways that have largely gone unnoticed.
Boards and commissions are a case in point. Each one created by charter attests that the voters are unwilling to entrust certain powers to elected officials. Each one has a responsibility to act as a countervailing force in county government; i.e. to serve the public interest and to oppose political interference in its discharge of its duties. For example, the Police Commission is empowered by state law and the charter to appoint the Police Chief and to oversee the work of the department.
The four-year term, with a near-certain eight years in office, blunts this purpose. By the beginning of the third year in office the mayor has appointed every member of every board and commission listed in the charter and will continue to control appointments throughout the eight years.
The powers associated with the appointing process are magnified by the lack of objective standards of eligibility for serving on a board/commission (appointments are simply a matter of “mayor’s choice”), the tendency of the council to rubber stamp appointments, and the cursory attention given to equipping appointees to do their jobs. All of these factors make it easier for the mayor to control boards/commissions and specifically to curtail their exercise of countervailing powers.
In the real world of county government one does not need to look far to find boards/commissions ill-equipped to exercise their countervailing powers and responsibilities or to find members who have a vested interest in pleasing elected officials or who see themselves as merely an arm of the administration. Similarly, conscientious appointees are often unprepared to deal with politically motivated agendas and influences.
As for the balance of power between mayor and council, rarely does the council call the chief executive to account, as would happen regularly in a county manager system. Even in the area of budget and appropriations, where the council holds clear countervailing power, there is a tendency to go along with the mayor’s priorities and succumb to administrative manipulations.
What to do about these power imbalances is one of the challenges facing the Charter Commission and the public it represents. The issue cannot be dealt with in isolation, as if restoring the two-year term for mayor would solve the problem. It is just one of several issues pressing to the surface due to changes that have occurred since the charter was adopted in 1969 — changes that require the Charter Commission, in accordance with its mandate, to conduct an in-depth “study and review” of government operations and alternatives for improving government that go beyond the usual “tweaks.”
The immediate question is this: When will the mayor stop holding hostage the right of the voters to change the charter and the duty of the Charter Commission to serve the public interest and instead allow the commission to start work? The last commission acknowledged its uncompleted task by recommending that the commission sit continuously for the next 10 years, and the voters approved. What is lacking is mayoral support for the commission’s recommendation and the voters’ mandate.
• Horace Stoessel lives in Kapa‘a and is a regular contributor to the Forum page.